Grand Strategy Annex

16th February 2012

Post with 4 notes

Of Distinctions, Weak and Strong

With special reference to the mind-body problem

A day or so ago in Naturalism and the Mind I posited a mind-body continuum in place of the traditional mind-body distinction familiar since Cartesian dualism. It has occurred to me that, wherever a traditional idealized distinction between two extremes is reformulated as a continuum, the traditional distinction can be reformulated in terms of distinct positions within the continuum.

Any point on a continuum must admit of one of five possibilities:

1) identical to the one end point, or

2) identical to the other end point, or

3) exactly midway between the one and the other end point, or

4) closer to the one end point than the other, or (finally),

5) closer to the other end point than the one.

This is simply the law of trichotomy for real numbers with finite end points for the continuum added, making for two further possibilities (though stated a little differently than is customary for the law of trichotomy).

Even with this very minimal schema of classification there are still several interesting derivations that can be made. If a point is not identical to the one end point, but is closer to the one than to the other, then it is farther from the other than it is from the one. This is one of many comparative relationships that will hold within a finite continuum.

Any two distinct points on a finite continuum will be separated by a certain distance from each other, and this distance will admit of being greater or less. Relations of greater and less are also comparative relationships, and comparative relationships are important because they are a step up from merely taxonomic or classificatory relationships.

Carnap made a tripartite distinction between taxonomic concepts (being the roughest and the least precise of scientific conceptions), comparative concepts, and quantitative concepts (which are the most precise of scientific concepts). Comparative concepts, being midway between classificatory and quantitative concepts, are an important stepping-stone on the way to scientificity, and admit of rudimentary formalization even when fully quantitative concepts are not possible or not yet practicable (cf. my Axioms and Postulates in Strategy).

Now, if a traditional distinction is reformulated in terms of two distinct points within a finite continuum extending from one extreme to the other, and in comparing the relationships between points in the finite continuum these relationships admit of greater or lesser proximity, the distinction so represented admits of greater or lesser proximity.

In other words, two distinct points on a continuum might be quite close together (though, since distinct, not identical) or they might be as far apart as the extreme end points. Where two points in a continuum are close together I will say that they are weakly distinct, whereas if they are (relatively) far apart, I will say that they are strongly distinct.

If we posit a mind-body continuum, then the traditional mind-body distinction is the distinction between the extreme end points of the continuum; these points are as far apart as possible, so if any two points at all are strongly distinct on this continuum, these two points are strongly distinct. Thus traditional Cartesian dualism represents a strongly distinct separation.

But I also suggested that, within the mind-body continuum, that there are closer relationships. For example, the distinction between a corporeal body and the function of a corporeal body (like the distinction between brains and neurological processes of the brain) is not nearly so great as the distinction between a corporeal body and an idea in the Kantian sense. We might say that a corporeal body and its function are only weakly distinct, as we might say that an idea of empirical science is weakly distinct from an idea in the Kantian sense.

Small differences in a continuum are weakly distinct; large differences in a continuum are strongly distinct. It will be obvious that both weakly distinct points and strongly distinct points are always symmetric, never reflexive, and while they may be transitive, they are not necessarily transitive but may also be intransitive. In fact, the most interesting cases will be the intransitive examples. 

If, for example, ideas of ordinary experience are only weakly distinct from empirical scientific ideas, and empirical scientific ideas are only weakly distinct from ideas in the Kantian sense, it may be the case that ideas of ordinary experience are yet strongly distinct from ideas in the Kantian sense.

It is possible that a detailed compilation of a mind-body continuum might yield sufficient examples of comparative concepts that a truly quantitative conception of the mind-body continuum might be within reach, and therefore also the possibility of a quantitative treatment of the traditional mind-body problem.

This is only the first sketch of the idea, so it is greatly wanting in detail, but it has a certain promise which, if considered sympathetically, suggests a new approach to a very old problem.

Tagged: Cartesian dualismphilosophyphilosophy of minddistinctioncontinuumlaw of trichotomymind-body problemmind-body continuummind-body distinctioncomparative conceptsCarnap